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EVIDENTIARY USE OF PRIOR ACQUITTALS:
WHEN ANALYSIS EXCEEDS REALITY
INTRODUCTION
NOT GUILTY. Even before the words have faded into silence, the rush of
emotion fills the defendant. While feelings of joy and satisfaction abound, one
emotion outweighs all others: relief. It's over. Having been accused and tried, he
has established his innocence; never again to be confronted with the same charges.
For after all, doesn't the Constitution protect him from having to go through this ever
again? Well--maybe!
"Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life and limb"' are the familiar words of the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause. As usually interpreted, the constitutional protections of this clause
prevent successive prosecutions following a final judicial disposition and eliminate
cumulative punishments for the same offense.2 The case of Dowling v. United
States3 examines the limits of that protection. Specifically, the issue raised is
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents, under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b),4 the introduction of prior criminal conduct of which the defendant has been
acquitted5 in a subsequent but unrelated criminal prosecution. While the question
has been addressed in both state and lower Federal courts,6 the Supreme Court for
the first time in Dowling squarely confronted the issue and decided that the consti-
tutional protections of Double Jeopardy and Due Process do not in all circumstances
prevent the admission of such evidence.7
The purpose of this note is to assess the basis and propriety of that decision and
to highlight some potential problems with the Court's conclusion. Additionally, this
casenote will attempt to envision how this holding may affect future prosecutions.
'U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The Double Jeopardy Clause contains three separate
constitutional protections: It protects against (a) a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal, (b) a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after conviction and (c) multiple punishments
for the same offense. See Kemmet, State v. DeLuca: Reinterpreting Double Jeopardy Protection Against
Successive Prosecutions, 41 RUrGERs L.R., 431,433 (1988). [hereinafter Reinterpreting Double Jeopardy].
3 Dowling v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 668 (1990). See text infra.
4 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is inadmissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan; knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
accident.
I For purposes of this note, "prior acquittal" means the defendant was tried before a jury on the merits and
found not guilty. It is not intended to include situations involving dismissals, mistrials, or multiple
inconsistent verdicts.
6 See, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence as to Other Offense as Affected by Defendant's Acquittal of That
Offense, 25 A.L.R. 4th 934 (1983).
1 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. 668, 672 (1990).
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Finally it will offer an alternative model which may more adequately address the
tension between the government's legitimate prosecutorial interests and the defen-
dant's interest in finality of judgment.
BACKGROUND
As developed within the civil law,8 the common law doctrine of collateral
estoppel9 generally operates to foreclose relitigation of issues conclusively deter-
mined during a previous litigation."° The doctrine seeks to promote judicial
economy, consistency, and finality." In application, the doctrine has often raised
questions as to the nature of the issues which may be precluded from relitigation.
Commentators generally categorize those issues as "ultimate" ("those facts upon
whose combined occurrence the law raises the duty or right in question")2 and
"mediate" ("those facts used as the inferential basis for the formation of ultimate
facts"). 3 Although some courts have held that estoppel is applicable only to facts
found to be ultimate with respect to the second suit, 4 in practice there is no consistent
and discernible distinction between them. 5 Thus, the differentiation has had little
practical effect. 6
While the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applied most frequently to civil
litigation, it also extends to criminal prosecutions. 17 In 19.70, the Supreme Court in
8 46 AM. JuR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 397, (1969). See for an overview of both res judicata and collateral estoppel
in the civil context.
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 comments (c) and (g) (1980). As used here, collateral estoppel
is to be distinguished from the somewhat broader concept of resjudicata. Sometimes called issue preclusion,
collateral estoppel operates to exclude from relitigation issues of fact and law. Res judicata or claim
preclusion prevents relitigation of the same cause of action as between the same parties once determined by
a valid, final judgment. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments, § 396, 397 (1969).
"0 James and Hazard, Civil Procedure § 11.16 (2d ed. 1977). As generally applied, the party seeking the
benefit of estoppel effect must show that the fact or issue to be excluded from relitigation was (1) actually
litigated in the previous action, (2) determined with finality, and (3) necessarily so determined.
"Note, Expanding Double Jeopardy: Collateral Estoppel and the Evidentiary Use of Prior Crimes of Which
the Defendant Has Been Acquitted, 2 Fla. St. U.L. Rev., 511, 516 (1974), [hereinafter Note, Expanding
Double Jeopardy]; Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 YALE L.J.,
962, 970 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Double Jeopardy].
' Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 720 (1944). The categorization of
facts as either ultimate or mediate is traced to Judge Learned Hand in the Evergreens decision.
" See Note, Expanding Double Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 519. "Mediate data" or evidentiary facts are
those which relate to incidental or collateral matters in the first proceeding and generally will not be the basis
of estoppel. Usually, for an issue to be precluded from relitigation, it must have been important enough so
that both parties have had an opportunity to fully litigate it. See, CoUtND FRiEDENTrAL AND MILLER, CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1090-1091 (3d ed. 1980).
14 Evergreens v. Nunnan, 141 F.2d at 930,31. "We do not hesitate to hold [that] no fact decided in the first
suit whether ultimate or mediate conclusively establishes anything except a fact ultimate in the second suit."
But see, U.S. v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961).
15 JAMES AND HAZARD, supra note 10. § 11.18, The supposed differences depend upon how the issue is
formulated. The more important distinction is whether the issue was central or peripheral to the first action.
'16 d. at 569. "The point is that the syllogistic position of the finding is less important than whether it was
fully litigated and necessarily decided."
17 See, Note, Double Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 971. See also, lB MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, .418 [2],
at 2751 (2d ed. 1974).
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Ashe v. Swenson,1 8 incorporated collateral estoppel as a constitutionally mandated
component of the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 9 As defined inAshe, criminal collateral
estoppel provides that "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by
a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be again litigated between the same
parties in any future lawsuit.' '20 Under Ashe, it is clear that the core protection 2 of
the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents relitigation of conclusively determined ulti-
mate facts.22 However, Ashe does not definitively determine whether such protec-
tion extends to evidentiary facts,23 particularly when a prior prosecution ends in a
general verdict of acquittal.2 4
Faced with this recurrent situation, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
have responded in one of three ways. Some have found that under Ashe the Court's
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the introduction of prior
acquittal evidence.2 5 Others have held, without reference to the Constitution, that
such evidence is inadmissible under the common law doctrine of collateral estop-
pel.26 Still others have allowed the evidence if otherwise admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence.27 To resolve this conflict among the federal circuit
11 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970). Ashe was accused of being one of several masked men
who robbed six men playing poker in the basement of a home. The State unsuccessfully prosecuted Ashe
for the robbery of one of the men. Following a subsequent conviction for robbery of another player, the
Supreme Court held the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be implicit within the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, the State was constitutionally precluded from relitigating the issue of
whether Ashe was one of the robbers.
1 9 Id. at 443.
20 Id.
21 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. 668, 675-76 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22 Ashe at 443. The Court acknowledged that not all the features of the civil law doctrine are applicable to
the criminal context. For example, it rejected mutuality of estoppel which requires that issues not determined
conclusively against one party shall not be considered to have been found favorably to a later opponent. See
Note, Expanding Double Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 517 n.35; LANDERS, MARTIN AND YEAZELL, CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 960-61 (2d ed. 1988).
23 Note, Expanding Double Jeopardy, supra note 11 at 520. "Thus, any determination of the effect of Ashe
upon the constitutionality of the evidentiary use of a prior acquittal will largely depend upon whether
collateral estoppel, as required by the Double Jeopardy Clause, should be applied only to the redetermina-
tion of the ultimate fact of defendant's guilt or whether the constitutional doctrine prohibits the introduction
of evidentiary facts of the prior acquittal."
2 Note, Double Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 973. Unless a court can trace some inescapable inference, as in
Ashe, a general acquittal provides little basis for the application of collateral estoppel.
21 Wingate v. Wainright, 464 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1972). (Where defendant was acquitted of prior
robberies, State violated defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause when it offered evidence of
such at a later robbery trial.); U.S. v. Mespulede, 597 F.2d 329, 334-35, (2d Cir. 1979). (Criminal acquittal
necessarily determines defendant's innocence, and government is precluded from injecting issues necessar-
ily decided in defendant's favor in a second trial.); Also see, U.S. v. Gonzales-Sanchez 825 F.2d 572, (1st
Cir. 1987); Albert v. Montgomery, 732 F.2d 865, (11 th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Day, 591 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1978).26 U.S. v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154, 1157 (3rd Cir. 1980), (As applied to criminal cases, doctrine of collateral
estoppel bars introduction of acquittal evidence.); U.S. v. Johnson, 697 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Collateral estoppel may bar relitigation of issues in criminal case when Double Jeopardy considerations are
absent)
27 U.S.v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954,957 (10th Cir. 1979), (Evidence of another crime, otherwise competent,
is not necessarily rendered inadmissible by fact of prior acquittal); U.S. v. Rocha, 553 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir.
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courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Dowling's contention that
admission of prior acquittal evidence violated both the Double Jeopardy and Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
28
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 8, 1985, a man wearing a ski mask and armed with a small hand gun
robbed the First Pennsylvania Bank of Frederikstad, St. Croix, Virgin Islands.
29
Upon exiting the bank, the robber commandeered a taxi van in an effort to escape.' 0
While driving away from the bank, the robber removed his mask and was identified
by a bank customer who had slipped out of the bank during the robbery.3 Basedupon
this identification,3 2 Ruben Dowling was charged with bank robbery,33 armed
robbery,34 and several violations of local law. Dowling pled not guilty.35 The first
trial ended in a hung jury.36 Upon retrial, Dowling was convicted notwithstanding
information available to the trial judge that the jury was made privy to extrinsic
evidence. 37 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded for
yet a third trial.
38
Shortly after the bank robbery, two men entered the home of Ms. Vena Henry
in Fredikstad in an apparent burglary attempt. 39 One man wore a ski mask40 and
carried a small pistol. The other was identified as Delroy Christian.4 1 Ms. Henry
alleged that she surprised the pair, and in the ensuing struggle, unmasked the man
whom she identified as Dowling.42 Prior to his third trial for bank robbery, 43 Dowling
2 8Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. 668,671 (1990). Petitioner Dowling additionally asserted that the Third Circuit
should have found constitutional violations and erred in declining to apply the Chapman v. California
harmless error standard. Champamv. California, 386 U.S. 18(1967), reh. den. 386 U.S. 987 (1967). Because
the Supreme Court found no constitutional violation, it did not reach this issue.
29 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. 668, 670 (1990). (The robber escaped with over $12,000 in cash and checks.)
30 Id. During the course of the robbery, a passing police cruiser chased away what the government contended
was the robber's getaway car. Police identified one of the occupants of the car as Delroy Christian.
Petitioner's Brief, 88-6025 (Lexis, Genfed, Briefs, File _ . [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief.]
31 See, Petitioner's Brief, supra note 30. Antonio Messer, a bank customer, fled the bank and watched the
robber exit from across the street. Messer observed the fleeing robber begin to remove the mask. Based upon
a three to four second observation, Messer identified Dowling as the robber.
3 2 Id. Because Messer's identification was suspect, the government sought to develop additional identifica-
tion evidence.
31 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. 668,670 (1990). (18 U.S.C. §2113 (a)).
- Id. (18 U.S.C. 2113 (d)).
35 Id.
36 U.S. v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 135 (3rd Cit. 1987).
37 Id. at 135-36.
38 Id. at 134.
39 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. 668, 670 (1990).
' See, Petitioner's Brief, supra note 30. No contention was made by the government that the mask was the
same one used in the bank robbery.
41 U.S. v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114 at 120. There was no apparent dispute as to Christian's presence in Henry's
home.
42 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 670.
43 Id.
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Summer, 1990] PRIOR ACQUITrALS
was tried under Virgin Island law for burglary, assault, and weapons offenses and
was acquitted of all charges." To strengthen its identity evidence4' and to further link
Dowling with Christian, the government was permitted, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b),4 6 to introduce the testimony of Ms. Henry at the third bank robbery
trial.47 She was allowed to testify that Dowling had entered her home wearing a
mask, notwithstanding Dowling's prior acquittal on those charges.4 8 At the close of
Henry's testimony and again during its final charge to the jury, the trial court
instructed the jury that Dowling had, indeed, been acquitted of robbing Henry and
emphasized the limited purposes for which Henry's testimony was offered.4 9
Dowling was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 70 years imprisonment on the
bank robbery charges.5 0
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, relying upon its decision in
United States v. Keller,1 held that Dowling's previous acquittal collaterally es-
topped the government from offering evidence of that incident at a subsequent
criminal trial. 52 Alternatively, the court found that the evidence was also inadmis-
sible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 3 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit affirmed
Dowling's conviction, finding that while the acquittal evidence was inadmissible,
the error was merely evidentiary and not of constitutional dimension. 4 Following
a denial of a motion for rehearing,55 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider




" See, supra note 30. During instruction to the jury, the District Court explained that the testimony was
offered "to the extent it helps you determine the identity" of the bank robber. Additionally, the government
sought to link Dowling and Christian to support its theory of a getaway car. U.S. v. Dowling, 855 F.2d at
124.
4 See, supra note 4.
41 U.S. v. Dowling, 855 F.2d at 120.
41 Id. On appeal to the Third Circuit, Dowling argued the introduction of Henry's testimony violated Fed.
R. Evid. 403. Relying on the Third Circuit's approach in Keller, see supra note 26, Dowling did not assert
a constitutional violation.491 Id. at 124. The court, prosecution, and defense emphasized the acquittal and the limited purposes for which
it could be used.
50 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 670.
"' See, supra note 26. The Third Circuit acknowledged the constitutional implications of Ashe, but relied upon
the Circuit's precedents which consistently applied the non-constitutional doctrine to bar evidentiary use of
acquittals. U.S. v. Dowling, 855 F.2d at 120-121. See also, U.S. v. Simon, 225 F.2d 260 (3rd Cir. 1955).52 Id. at 121, 122. The government argued that Keller is applicable only when the evidentiary fact sought to
be introduced has "actually been determined" in the defendant's favor. The Third Circuit rejected the
government's position holding that nothing in their precedents "puts the gloss on Keller that the government
argues." Id.
131 d. at 122. The Appellate court held that the prior acquittal "must be taken to signify that it was not proven
that Dowling committed a 'bad' act," and concluded the admission was an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 124. The Appellate court observed that "evaluation of prejudice occasioned by trial error is a fact-
specific process." In view of the entire record, the court determined the additional identity evidence
convincing enough to conclude Dowling was not unduly prejudiced. See also, Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct.
at 671.
11 Id. at 124. See, Petitioner's Brief, supra note 30 at __
56 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 671.
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The Court began its analysis by recognizing that the sole issue before it was
whether Vena Henry's testimony was admissible.57 Following a brief review of
Ashe,5" the Court distinguished the present case fromAshe by finding that Dowling's
prior acquittal did not "determine an ultimate issue in the present case.' 59 The Court
reasoned that Dowling's acquittal would not necessarily force a second jury to reach
a conclusion directly contrary to the first.6" Therefore, the Court summarily declined
to "extend Ashe v. Swenson, and the collateral estoppel component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circumstances, as Dowling would have it, relevant
and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible" simply because that evidence
relates to alleged criminal conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted." 61
While this holding clearly indicates the Court's unwillingness to construct an
exclusionary rule which would absolutely bar the introduction of prior acquittal
evidence, it leaves several questions unanswered. First, the Court failed to explain
why the distinction from Ashe would necessitate such a radically different outcome;
why would the distinction make a difference? Secondly, while the Court did not
completely preclude the possible exclusion of prior acquittal evidence,62 it did not
delineate the circumstances under which such evidence could be excluded. Al-
though the Court did not explicitly resolve these questions, some inferences and
possible conclusions can be drawn from the decision.
1. Burden of Proof
Perhaps the clearest explanation of the Court's decision lies within the
language of Ashe. Quoting Ashe, the Court reiterated that it "must examine the
record of the prior proceeding ... and conclude whether a rational jury could have
grounded its verdict on an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose
from consideration.' '63 The Court cited, with approval, several Appellate cases
which, following this general rule, placed the burden upon the defendant to
determine that the issue to be precluded was actually decided in his favor during the
first trial.64 The Court concluded that Dowling presented no reason to depart from
57Id.
58 See supra note 18.
51 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 672.
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 See supra note 15. Presumably, exclusion would be appropriate if, as in Ashe, the fact to be relitigated was
to be considered "ultimate" with respect to the second trial.63 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 673.
64 U.S. v. Citron, 853 F.2d 1055, 1058 (2d Cir. 1988). Unlike Dowling however, Citron involved a prior
prosecution resulting in inconsistent verdicts: an acquittal of falsifying tax returns but conviction on tax
evasion. The court noted that, consistent with Ashe, it should avoid making the defendant's burden difficult,
but the inconsistent verdicts served to foreclose preclusive effects. Also cited is U.S. v. Mock, 640 F.2d 629,
631 (5th Cir. 1981). In Mock, the Appellate Court stated "this Circuit has decided that the protections of
[Vol. 24:1
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this rule.65
This is the customary collateral estoppel rule in civil actions,66 which, when
applied to criminal prosecutions, raises obvious problems for the defendant. Since
most criminal verdicts are general verdicts, it is often impossible to trace the jury's
reasoning and precisely ascertain the issues which were conclusively determined in
the defendant's favor.67 As Justice Brennan explains in dissent, by "placing the
burden on the defendant to prove what was 'actually decided', the Court denies the
protections of collateral estoppel to those defendants who affirmatively contest more
than one issue or who put the Government to its proof with respect to all elements
of the offense." 68
Since the defendant must bear the burden of proof, the court must then
determine the level of proof necessary to meet that burden. Again, the language of
Ashe is instructive, yet inconclusive. While the Ashe Court held that a "high
probability" that the jury determined an issue in the defendant's favor was insuffi-
cient,69 the Court did not require the probability to rise to a logical certainty.70 The
Ashe Court carefully warned that the protection of collateral estoppel in criminal
cases was not to be applied with the "hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th
century pleading book." ' 71  Any more rigid approach would render criminal
collateral estoppel ineffective. 72 Therefore, it appears the Court would consider
exclusion of evidentiary facts, even though not ultimate with respect to the second
trial, if there were compelling evidence that those facts were determined in favor of
the defendant.
Justice Brennan's alternative approach seemingly strikes a middle ground by
permitting the prosecution to admit prior acquittal evidence, while shifting the
burden to the government to establish that the issue it seeks to relitigate was not
decided in the defendant's favor.73 As Justice Brennan explained, this method would
better serve the purposes of both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the collateral
estoppel doctrine by reducing the possibility of governmental overeaching74 and by
collateral estoppel prevent redetermination of evidentiary facts as well as ultimate facts." The problem was
that Mock had not shown the subsequent evidence concerned the particular acquittal. See also U.S. v. Ragins,
840 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Gentile, 816 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussion of "necessarily
determined").
6' Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 673.
6 JAMES AND HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §11.18 at 567 (2d ed. 1977).
67 See Note, Double Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 972-73; Note, Exclusion of Prior Acquittals: An Attack on
the "Prosecutor's Delight", 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV., 892, 916 (1974). [hereinafter Note, Prior Acquittals].
Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 677 (Brennan J., dissenting).
9 See Note, Double Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 972 n.54.
70 Id.
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,444.
72 Id.
73 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 677 (Brennan J., dissenting).
74 1d. at 676. Quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), and U.S. v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), the dissent
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preserving the institutional interest in finality of judgments."
2. Standards of Admissibility
Apart from the burden of proof argument, the Court attempted to justify the
admission of prior acquittal evidence under Huddleston v. U.S. 76 The Huddleston
Court determined that evidence of similar acts is relevant and therefore admissible77
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)78 if the jury can reasonably conclude that the
act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.79 The court reasoned that even if
Dowling's acquittal did establish a reasonable doubt that he was the masked man in
Vena Henry's home, it did not prove his innocence.80 Therefore, because a jury
might reasonably conclude that Dowling was the masked man in question, the
evidence was admissible under the Huddleston standard.81 The Court deemed the
collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause inapposite.82 The
Court found this decision to be consistent with previous cases in which a prior
criminal acquittal had not precluded the government from relitigating an issue when
presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.83
This reasoning is disturbing for at least two reasons. Even if an acquittal had
clearly determined a single issue in the defendant's favor, therefore warranting
collateral estoppel protection, the government could legitimately seek admission
under the lower standard of proof required by Huddleston.84 Secondly, the Court
cites U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,5 and One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.
U.S.86 as precedent consistent with the proposition that a criminal acquittal does not
interest in finality and a public interest against the governmental use of its superior resources.
75 Id.
76 U.S. v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 (1988). Huddleston was charged with the knowing possession of stolen
video tapes. The District Court permitted evidence of'"similar acts" linking the defendant to a series of sales
of allegedly stolen televisions from the same source. The Court found the evidence clearly relevant to
defendant's knowledge that the tapes were stolen. This "similar act" evidence was, therefore, admissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
77 FED R. EviD. 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided .... Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.
78 See supra note 4.
9 U.S. v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988). The Court held the trial court need not make a preliminary
finding that the government has proved the "other act" evidence by a preponderance of the evidence before
admitting it under 404(b). Id. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the plain language and
legislative history of Rule 404(b). Id. at 688.
8 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 672. The Court believed that Dowling's acquittal merely proved the existence
of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. See, U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984).
81 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 668.
8I Id. at 672.
83 Id. at 672.
84 U.S. v. Huddleston, 485 u.S. at 681.
15 U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984). Acquittal on the charge of dealing firearms
did not preclude subsequent in rem forfeiture hearing. Id.
86 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. U.S., 409 U.S. 232 (1972). Defendant's acquittal on smuggling charge did
not bar later forfeiture hearing. Id.
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preclude relitigation of an issue in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard
of proof.8 7 However, both of these cases involved a criminal acquittal followed by
a subsequent civil forfeiture action.18 The lower standard of proof in these cases
involved the level at which ajury may conclude guilt, not the level at which evidence
becomes relevant. Dowling, by contrast, involved a criminal acquittal followed by
a second criminal prosecution. The standard of proof necessary for conviction is
precisely the same in both cases. It does not follow that because subsequent civil
actions governed by a lower standard of proof are permissible, that relitigation of
prior acquittal evidence avoids collateral estoppel merely because the relevancy
standard of similar act evidence is also lower. In response, Justice Brennan notes that
the Court had never before applied such reasoning to successive criminal prosecu-
tions where the government seeks to punish. 9 Brennan also characterized the
Court's reasoning as an "unrealistic view of the risks and burdens imposed on the
defendant." 90
Realistic concerns also arise when a defendant is forced to relitigate an
acquittal issue under a lower standard of proof. Evidence of prior criminal
participation, even though the defendant has been acquitted, is likely to prejudice the
jury and lead to an erroneous conviction. 9' In fact, the Court recognized the potential
for undue prejudice 92 but concluded that a defendant is adequately protected by non-
constitutional sources like the Federal Rules of Evidence and limiting instructions
to juries. 93 Additionally, the defendant must essentially "re-defend" himself on
charges of which he was acquitted.94 Because of increased costs and the passage of
time, this may be extremely burdensome.95 Since "the lower standard of proof
makes it easier for the jury to conclude that the defendant committed the prior
offense, the defendant is essentially forced to present affirmative evidence to rebut
the contention that he committed the offense.' '96
s Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 672.
8 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938). Acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to remedial
civil action.
19 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 678 (Brennan J., dissenting). "Where the objective of the second action
likewise is punishment, the acquittal is a bar to relitigation." Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 398, quoting
Murphy v. U.S., 272 U.S. 630 (1926).
90Dowlingv. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 678 (Brennan J., dissenting). See, Miller, Other Crimes Evidence: Relevance
Reexamined, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV., 371, 387-88 (1983).
"1 Id. at 676. It seems questionable whether a jury can reasonably be expected to separate impeachment and
substantive evidence. The possibility of misuse and the unduly prejudicial effects underscore the need to
exclude prior acquittal evidence. See, Note, Prior Acquittals, supra note 67 at 917; Miller, Other Crimes
Evidence: Relevance Reexamined, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 371, 389 (1983).
92 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 674.
93 Id.
9' Wingate v. Wainright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972). There is no reasoned difference between this fact
pattern and the exclusion of subsequent prosecutions which are routinely the object of Double Jeopardy
protection.
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Due Process
Dowling also argued that the admission of Vena Henry's testimony violated
due process because it offended the concept of "fundamental fairness."'97 The Court
reiterated its narrow view of fundamental fairness and reaffirmed that beyond the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, it found the Due Process Clause limited in
applicability.98 In dismissing Dowling's contention that the evidentiary admissions
were fundamentally unfair,99 the Court insisted that the trial court's limiting instruc-
tions avoided any Due Process concerns.10
Possible Extensions
The scenario in Dowling has been referred to as the "Prosecutor's De-
light." '01 The ability to relitigate facts relating to an acquittal not only disadvantages
the defendant but may also greatly expand the government's ability to prosecute. For
instance, Double Jeopardy protection customarily applies when two offenses are
part of the same transaction. 02 After Dowling, a prosecutor could presumably
introduce substantive evidence in a conspiracy prosecution even though the defen-
dant had been acquitted of the underlying offense.0 3 Additionally, evidence from
a prior acquittal might be admissible in a subsequent sentencing hearing which
requires a lower standard of proof."°
Alternative Model
Following Dowling, there is little doubt about the admissibility of prior
acquittal evidence. What remains an issue is how to best accommodate the
competing concerns of the defendant and the government. A possible alternative to
the Dowling rule would be to create a presumption that prior acquittal evidence must
be excluded in subsequent criminal prosecutions unless the government can rebut,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the issue was not determined in the
defendant's favor. Such a threshold requirement would insure careful scrutiny under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.1"5 The rebuttable presumption alternative is also
17 Id. at 674.
98 Id. The Court quoting U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977), observed that judges are not free, in
defining due process, to impose their own "private notions of fairness," but must determine whether the
actions complained of violate the "fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and
political institutions."
" Id. at 675.
100 Id. at 674.
""
1 See Note, Prior Acquittals, supra note 67 at 896. Admission of evidence under 404(b) creates an exception
to the general rule excluding the use of prior acts to prove subsequent crimes. This exception presents the
prosecutor with few situations in which he would be unable to link evidence of prior acts to the current case.
See Note, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REV., 281, 306-08 (1980).
'01 See Note, Reinterpreting Double Jeopardy, supra note 2 at 434.
103 Dowling v. U.S., 110 S.Ct. at 680 (Brennan J., dissenting).
104 Id.
105 FED. R. EVID. 403. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
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consistent with the admonition in Ashe concerning the over-technical application of
collateral estoppel."°6
CONCLUSION
The Dowling Court's refusal to extend the constitutional protections of
Double Jeopardy to exclude the admission of prior acquittal evidence is unrealistic.
Relying upon non-constitutional protections, such as evidentiary rules and limiting
instructions to juries, is insufficient to shield the previously acquitted defendant from
the risk of undue prejudice and the burden of relitigation. Because Dowling does not
require the exclusion of such evidence, the courts must determine a method which
more equitably balances the interests of both the defendant and the government.
PAUL HARPER
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ....
106 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 444.
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